In Karl Popper’s paradox of tolerance, it is demonstrated that combating intolerance inherently requires intolerance, for combating intolerance necessitates society to be intolerant of people who are intolerant. As demonstrated by Popper in this paradox, through combating intolerance, intolerance is invoked. I believe that a very similar paradox also exists regarding the concept of dogma. Herein I will show that the only manner by which dogmatic thinking can be attacked is through the use of dogma, in a much similar way in which Karl Popper displayed that the only way that intolerance can be attacked is through the use of intolerance. To interject a brief remark that may perhaps have been better suited to a preface prior to the start of my essay: the framework present within the paradox of intolerance will partially constitute the structure of my proposed paradox of dogma, yet, there will be some noticeable differences at the structural level, and obviously, the content will be different.
For those who abide by a manner of thinking whereby dogmas and dogmatic thinking are opposed and rejected, the rejectors of dogma themselves, who can be defined as a group by their shared characteristic of possessing a rejection of apparent dogmas, are doing so based on dogmas that they abide by. Ultimately, the acceptance of whatever foundational axiom that knowledge proceeds from is inherently dogmatic. It would seem that a foundational epistemic axiom (or plurality of epistemic axioms) must be accepted so that those who accept it may be able to possess knowledge and thus engage in argumentation—as is the case in foundationalist accounts in epistemology, such as rationalism, which starts at reason, and empiricism, which starts at sense perception. However, there are also epistemic accounts wherein all foundations are accepted without question, and there is no reliance on doubt, and a subsequent reduction to a single axiom (or plurality of axioms) that are considered at the foundation of knowledge, such as coherentism, and pragmatism. In the former, there is ultimately an epistemic axiom, or plurality of epistemic axioms, accepted without rationale. In the ladder, a wider spread of components at the foundation of knowledge, including those at and those beyond the axiomatic stage, are accepted without rationale. Argumentation is not possible without knowledge, and as I shall display further, justification for the validity of one's own knowledge is not possible without dogmatism.
The seemingly non–dogmatic methods of aquiring justification for knowledge are themselves dogmatic, for they are based at least upon a foundational epistemic axiom that goes unquestioned and is not dissented. By its very nature, an axiom is not substantiated by anything prior to it, but is instead accepted intuitively. In this, their acceptance is irrational, and it inherently requires a leap of faith, for there cannot be any rationale for the acceptance of a foundational epistemic axiom, as the epistemic axiom precedes reason, even if the axiom itself is reason. In the ascription of anything as self-evident, a denial of the necessity of evidence for that very thing is posited, and as I have shown prior, evidence is not even possible at the axiomatic level, and ultimately, to seek evidence for an axiom is to fundamentally undercut the essence of an axiom, for axioms are supposed to be self-evident.
Dogmatism is present at the initial acceptance of foundational epistemic axioms, much like an obstetrician is present at the birth of a child. This dogmatism is adjacent to human intuition, which could be described as the woman giving birth in this analogy. Finally, the baby being delivered in this analogy is itself the epistemic axiom. Ultimately, we are all subject to dogmatism that collectively originates in our intuitions and is made manifest in our intuitional acceptance of the epistemic axiom that paves the way for us to have knowledge. Also, the question as to what is the epistemic axiom—or perhaps plurality of axioms—that is at the foundation of knowledge is a largely irrelevant question, and I will thus not seek to put forth an answer as to what I think it is. No matter what the axiom is, by virtue of it being an axiom, it will be accepted without evidence or rationale, and thus, the answer to this question is irrelevant to the overall discussion at hand. What is ultimately important is the conclusion that we are all inherently dogmatic.
The noteworthy implications of the conclusion that we are all dogmatic do not concern those who are already evidently dogmatists in that they would be dogmatists even if my conclusion that we were all dogmatists was wrong. Instead the noteworthy implications of this conclusion regard those who attack dogma. In light of this conclusion, the attacks on dogma by rejectors of dogma are rendered as being self-defeating, for the attacks against dogma are ultimately predicated on dogma, as all knowledge ultimately proceeds from axioms that are dogmatically accepted, and knowledge is necessary for all argumentation. This is my proposed paradox of dogma.
Among the structural differences that my proposed paradox of dogma bears in comparison to the paradox of tolerance, there is a particularly significant difference that I believe it is worth detailing, that being: intolerance is invoked only by the invocation of an attack against intolerance. On the other hand, in the case of dogma, as I have shown prior, all arguments funnel down to a dogmatic origin, and thus, dogma is not just invoked in attacking adherence to dogma. Herein is perhaps the most significant difference between the two paradoxes that does not concern their content—obviously, the content of the two frameworks is going to be different from each other.
It remains the case that it may appear ridiculous for one to invoke something that they are against to attack said thing that they are against, which is the case both with tolerance and with dogma in their respective paradoxes. However, this does not necessarily mean that doing such (ie. attacking intolerance by being intolerant and attacking dogmatic thinking by dogmatic thinking) is necessarily wrong, even if it appears to be ridiculous and illogical. However, I believe that it is very noteworthy that in the same manner that we cannot escape intolerance, we also cannot escape dogma.
The ideas that I have presented herein should not be construed as indicating that I have no opposition to any iterations of intolerance and dogmatic thinking, or that I view all intolerance and all dogma as equal. Ultimately, some variations of intolerance and dogmatic thinking are worse than other iterations—this is a sentiment that I strongly affirm, especially in the case of the former. However, as I have shown in this essay, intolerance and dogmatic thinking are ultimately inescapable on the whole. Much like how the invocation of intolerance is required to combat intolerance, likewise, the invocation of dogma is necessary to attack dogma.
Thank you so much for reading,
-Eli Gardenswartz
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