Zhuang Zhou once dreamt that he was a butterfly, and then woke up to discover that he was himself. He then posited that he could have actually been the butterfly, simply dreaming of being Zhuang Zhou. This is a fascinating parable that has many possible interpretations, one of such being an interpretation that takes an underlying theme in the parable, and uses it to challenge fundamental tenets of epistemology. The theme in question would be the uncertainty of the validity of our conscious experience of reality, and the content of the outside world. This, however, did not seem to be a concept that Zhuang Zhou intended on touching upon in delivering this parable, and I believe that it is worth noting this for the sake of historical accuracy before moving on. I will, however, be analyzing this concept.
Although competing schools of epistemological thought attempt to justify truth, they all ultimately rely on notions of truth, which are also incorporated into their devised frameworks. In the methods and ideations employed by epistemology, logic is evidently present. Now, in a framework where the foundational basis of reality, which ultimately governs our approach to epistemology, is shaken up by an unraveling, then all we would be left with is logic, if even that. It does not appear to be the case that the proposed alternate reality - where Zhuang Zhou is truly a butterfly - within this parable is one which is void of logic. However, I will consider the possibility of a world void of even logic and coherence, one which uses the butterfly dream as a starting point but tears through the nature of reality even deeper. Ultimately, what I hope to show here, is that all accounts of epistemology are ultimately fallible, and that this could even be the case for a given epistemic school of thought even if it were to be affirmed as being correct.
The butterfly dream appears to present the idea that reality can be entirely different than it may be grasped. If such were to be the case, to the point where not only sense-perception was nonexistent, but even logic, then a rationalist viewpoint circumstantially crumbles, for this world is void of logic. To exemplify this point, Descartes’ "cogito ero sum" refers to himself as the object of the statement, which could not be true if his existence in a corresponding true reality was that of a "non-self" -that is to say that he has no existence, for in this reality where logic is void, the law of non-contradiction does not hold. In such an instance, he is not - non est. Furthermore, the statement itself is predicated on logic, and as such, the inference is not applicable to this world.
Additionally, an empirical viewpoint cannot account for this unraveling, and thus crumbles in this circumstance, in the sense that this different “true” reality cannot be known through observation. Moreover, a constructivist viewpoint cannot account for it because the nature of the other reality cannot be grasped and processed cognitively. Furthermore, the epistemological system within transcendental idealism fails in such an instance, in that the content found within the mind would differ in such an instance, potentially alongside the mind itself.
I would wager that among other epistemological schools of thought there is no school that would not come crumbling down upon a revelation that our reality is entirely false, aside from, potentially: skepticism. A variation of skepticism that challenges tenets that regard the external world and one's own mind, not necessarily in regard to its ontology, but rather in regard to the content within, along with the existence of logic, may not seem as if it would come crumbling down in this instance. However, the argumentation would still be based within logic, and would thus not be applicable, and as such, it would indeed collapse. As I implied earlier, essentially all epistemological schools of thought rely on sense data in certain regards. A wrecking of knowledge severely shakes up, if not destroys, the study of knowledge, at least in a temporal manner.
I must clarify, that when I say, “falls apart,” I do not mean that the entire frameworks are made entirely bunk, but rather that they are bunk in the case of such an exception wherein the world I am positing is the true nature of the world - waiting to be revealed when reality dissipates. Furthermore, it would not be the framework themselves in concept that would collapse, but rather the frameworks as they are applied to our perceived reality, that would collapse. Most of these schools of thought should be able to adapt to an unveiled reality if the unveiled reality were to operate in the same logical framework. In this, their demise should only be temporal.
I must state that I would not consider Gnosticism to pose a distinction between true and false realities akin to that which I am considering here, for it permits a grasp of the true reality in instances, and it posits an interconnected scope of knowledge between the posited illusionary physical reality, and the transcendent “true” reality. The frameworks which I am considering are those which are untouchable and destroy the knowledge within our visible reality. Thus it differs from the type of framework in which I am looking to examine the meta-epistemological consequences of. In the same manner, Plato’s allegory of the cave would likewise be something that I would not consider in this discussion, alongside the corresponding Platonic ideas which are derived from it. Evidently, Gnosticism largely spirates out of later developments of Platonism.
Now, what if our perceptions were not really our perceptions? In this question, I am not probing the content of our perception as I have prior, but rather I am probing the nature of our perception. As I have hinted at prior, it could very well be that the consciousness we are in could differ from truth, not only in regards to the sense data we perceive, but also in regard to who we are - that our true self in a different reality which we do not grasp is a different person, that we somehow correspond to, although being yet distinct. It could be that we are simply within the mind of another - the person in the true reality - as is the case in the butterfly dream. This is all in contrast to a postulation that we are simply ourselves, but are experiencing reality in an illusionary manner, grasping at a false reality, while truly existing within a reality that we cannot grasp at.
Do I believe that we are in an illusionary reality? No. However, I am not at all denying that such could be the case. In fact, the postulation that we are experiencing an illusion is unfalsifiable. We simply cannot know with assurance whether or not it is the case. Subsequently, all epistemic schools of thought are fallible, even if they are correct. This notion may seem paradoxical, but it is ultimately true, although by that same token, my assessment of its possible falsehood could itself be false.
Thank you for reading,
- Eli Gardenswartz
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