As I have extensively talked about in my prior blog post “The Paradox of Dogma,” there is ultimately a necessity for a dogmatic acceptance of certain axioms at the bedrock of epistemology, axioms that each, either individually within a system, or among others in a system, serve as a starting point for the procession of knowledge—not only in a foundationalist account, but within all other epistemological views aswell, which, as I have demonstrated rely on both this dogmatic acceptance of certain foundational axioms and other tenets that underlie a comprehensive scope of knowledge, often far prior to the baseline of such systems. Albeit, this only fully applies to systems that do not engage in alternative means of justification apart from declaring it to be self-evident, those being the two other options in the Munchhausen trilemma: argumentation by means through infinite regress, and argumentation in a circular manner (employing circular logic).
The fallaciousness of the alternative manners of justifying knowledge at the bedrock of knowledge that are given in the Munchhausen trilemma are more evident, and are generally not propagated, as is the assertion of a self-evident belief—a foundational axiom—and as such my scope only includes the axiomatic justification, the fallaciousness of which is largely ignored. It is the declaration of things as being self-evident, and their subsequent acceptance as axioms, that I am primarily focusing on herein.
I largely emphasized the role of dogmatism in acceptance of axioms at the bedrock of knowledge in my prior blog post “The Paradox of Dogma,” and in this post I shall emphasize another aspect within the acceptance of axioms, that being: blind faith. Dogmatism and blind faith could be considered synonymous, and in a sense they are, yet they are not fully synonymous, and thus I believe that I am justified in analyzing them as distinct, yet connected, aspects of acceptance of axioms upon their examination past the culmination of knowledge and a review of one's own beliefs. The isolation and analysis of the blind faith aspect of acceptance of axioms at the bedrock of knowledge could elicit apparent connections to religious beliefs, for religious beliefs are often largely based on faith—often blind faith.
Ultimately, faith in certain epistemic axioms (eg. reason) should be understood as being no less justified as faith in God, for both of these things require faith. In the case of God, I believe that this faith is post-reason, as I lay out in my blog post “Beyond Finitism and Rationality: The Search for Non-Nullified Meaning.” In the case of axioms, I believe that this faith comes prior to reason (it is pre-reason), as I lay out in my blog post “The Paradox of Dogma.” Regarding belief in God that involves purely blind-faith, I would argue that its justification is precisely equal to that of epistemic axioms. Regarding belief in God that involves reason in the form of rationale, it has a leg up on reason itself, among other possible epistemic axioms, in that it has rationale, which such axioms cannot have, for they are simply asserted, as opposed to proceeding from any sort of rationale.
Now, it most definitely could be said that the acceptance of a given epistemic axiom is justified in that all attempts to justify or critique its justification rely on said axiom in some form. The same thing could not be said about a God whereby the universe originated from, that is, unless he exists, for his existence would entail all things, including the very words that are spoken in attempts to justify or critique the justification of God, to originate in his creation of the universe, and the subsequent unfolding of all things therein. In this, God, if he exists, would necessarily precede attempts at his very justification or the critique of the justification for his existence, in the same manner that an acceptance of reason—which could either be designated as being the axiom that knowledge proceeds from, as would be the case in a rationalist system, or a necessary proceeding step from another axiom towards knowledge—precedes a justification for reason, or a critique of the justification of reason.
Much like the existence of God, the existence of any given axiom—depending on what foundation by which one’s account of knowledge is built on—likewise cannot be verified, but is yet accepted by humans, and utilized in their lives. However, unlike an epistemic axiom, the existence of which is accepted by all (who have the capability to do so), the existence of God is not accepted by all. Yet, this does not entail that God is less likely to exist than any given epistemic axiom is, for the existence of a given thing is distinct from the belief that is had in the very thing. Ultimately, what I am attempting to show is that belief in God is no less rational than belief in any given epistemic axiom by which knowledge emerges from in some manner.
Perhaps, I could define God as a foundational epistemic axiom, as I would in my own attempts to ground knowledge. I believe that logic is fundamental, and either proceeds sense data, or is parallel to it, and as I have shown in my blog post “Escaping Logic” I believe that God is the ultimate and ideal axiom preceding logic, which in my system is at the foundation along with sense data. In “Escaping Logic” I show that only the invocation of God can justify logic in a non fallacious manner. God ultimately rises above the Munchhausen trilemma and the issue posed therein, for a transcendent being, and only a transcendent being, can transcend the issue posed by the trilemma, for a fully transcendent being—God—transcends all. In this, the assertion of God could even not be an assertion, for God could transcend above the concept of assertion. Ultimately, like reason, sense data, or other things that may be considered axioms, none of them can be inherently fully proven, or justified as to why they should serve as the foundation, or trusted.
Regarding God, the invocation of God evidently requires a necessary element of faith. But, at the bedrock of epistemology, as I have shown prior in this essay, everything requires faith, whether it is belief in God as a grounding, or in a foundational axiom, which is assented to by faith. Dare I say, it is a leap of faith that is necessary.
A certain mindset, that of hyper-rationalization, to the point of necessitating that everything ought to be rationalized and proven----often by a strict empirical or logical methodology---is commonplace in the west. The need to justify everything is ultimately present in the west, and this is the natural conclusion of a set of thinking whereby rationality is placed at the forefront, while faith, mystery, and other things of this sort are either subordinated or discarded. Furthermore, this way of thinking will eventually seek to attempt to prove itself—rightfully so—for it is by this that is seeks to arrive at truth, and we see this in Descartes and his program of doubt, which I believe is the natural conclusion of this manner of thinking, and ultimately even the Cogito is not the farthest that one can doubt, for one could even doubt themselves and reason itself. To go farther is to never return, for without reason or sense experience—the latter of which is already denied through Cartesian doubt—is to make it impossible to climb back up without an abandonment of the mission. Ultimately, a regiment of doubt, like that of Descartes, has to rely on faith, even if this faith is not expressed or understood as being explcit.
As I have shown, there is ultimately a requirement of faith at the bedrock level, and when it is discarded, rationality destroys itself. I believe that there is a mystic mindset at the heart of rationality, and that we ought to accept elements of faith, mystery, and other things of the sort, or else rationality will destroy itself, as displayed herein, particularly within the Munchhausen trilemma. In the Munchhausen trilemma, it is made very evident that rationality cannot account for itself in an epistemological context, and in this, the door is open for a necessary acceptance of certain foundational tenets on the basis of faith, which is something that is in fact already done—carried out through human intuition, which affirms that which is necessary for knowledge, thought, and reason. Faith is already implicit, and I believe that it is necessary to not shy away from it, but to rather accept it, and make it explicit in discourse and the way in which we think, and thereby, in the way in which we act, for the way in which one acts largely follows from the way in which they think. However, this should not entail the denial of rationality.
Thank you so much for reading.
-- Eli Gardenswartz
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