Humanity is bound to logic, and there is seemingly no way to escape logic, as even anti-logic sentiments will still be within logic. I, myself believe that there is no immanent way to escape logic.
One could assert themselves above logic, claiming to retroactively negate their use of logic in attempts to argue against logic. They might claim that they are outside of logic, by retroactive negation of the logic in past claims. Yet even so, statements made about a total triumph over the bounds of logic will still be in the bounds of logic, and any retroactive negation will likewise be bounded by logic, requiring further retroactive negation, which creates the same issues. This cycle of attempted negation would be never-ending.
In the same way that anti-logic statements are yet bound by logic, pro-logic statements which look to affirm logic will also be bound by logic. In the case of pro-logic statements which look to justify the use of logic, an issue is present. Such affirmatory statements will end up being illogical. Pro-logic statements which seek to affirm and justify logic use logic, which is what they are trying to affirm. To affirm logic by means of logic would be tantamount to circular logic, which is logically fallacious, and thus: illogical. Even in affirmation of logic, there seems to be a need to “escape logic," to avoid epistemic circularity in logic. Herein is the Munchhausen trilemna.
One may not even believe it to be necessary to justify the use of logic, believing it to be a self-evident truth, but I believe that even logic should not be immune to requiring a justification. In regard to the notion of logic as a self-evident truth, the placement of this thought into a logical claim which asserts this to be the case will also be problematic. I will address this in the following paragraph.
A statement that claims that logic is a self-evident truth is not immune to being bound up in logic. The claim that logic is self-evident is likewise a pro-logic statement, and its justification of logic as a self-evident truth is no different than any other pro-logic statement in the regard that logic is employed. By making any claim, logic is invoked, and in the case of making the claim that logic is self-evident, logic is likewise invoked. I would thus say that a need to “escape logic” is necessary. Without an "escape from logic," I believe that there can be no epistemic justification for logic. The necessity for this justification may seem unnecessary, however, I believe it to be necessary.
So then, how can we “escape logic?” Far earlier in this writing, I outlined a possible approach to escaping logic, which I then criticized for creating a never-ending cycle of utilizing logic. I believe that logically immanent approaches will always fail. Instead, I believe that an appeal should be made to something which is transcendent above logic. Now, what can be transcendent above logic? Something which would be transcendent above logic is a hypothetical transcendent God that is transcendent above all - who I will also call omnipotent. A hypothetical transcendent and omnipotent God is transcendent above all, and “all” includes logic. Such a God could negate the logical bounds used in reference to itself as an object, and thus break the chain of circularity. This God would be self-evident and self-justificatory. Logic could thus be accounted for by God, and the logic used to define its relationship to God could be negated in such a way that it does not use logic, with this and all further propositions having the ability to have the logic of such be retroactively negated by God, as made possible by omnipotence.
To clarify, by means of transcendence, something outside of logic can be invoked to justify logic. Furthermore, by means of omnipotence, the logical tie which creates circularity in the relationship between the transcendent justifier and logic itself can have the logical component of itself negated, thus preventing any occurrence of circular logic. Now this framework would require am invocation of God - there is no denying this. However, if such a framework would provide the best possible justification for logic, then perhaps the presupposition of this God would be necessary. Furthermore, God could justify the presupposition of himself. In this framework, I believe there to be an epistemic justification for logic.
Now, these claims are likewise bound by logic, but they can be justified by the God that they presuppose, if we were to adapt this framework to be on the same plane as the level of analysis by which we are analyzing this framework, which could be possible due to the omnipotence of God, which allows for all, including this. Even the immanent concept - this framework for justifying logic - can be on the same plane as the analysis of itself, which transcends above it in analyzing it. This could be done by means of the omnipotent facet of the postulation. This postulation acts as a cop-out, however, that does not take away from the fact that this framework can justify logic without using logic, with all of the logic used being negated by the postulated God.
The crux of this essay is an argument that affirms the existence of a transcendent justifier of logic - God - with the ability to allow for the logic used to be negated. While logic may come from this being, in my argumentation, it will be the necessity for the existence of such a being to justify logic, since only this being has the capabilities to justify logic. In my argument, there is a biconditional relationship between the justification of logic and the existence of this being (God) with the aforementioned abilities. Thus, in affirming the justification of logic, it would therefore entail the existence of logic. Furthermore, while I may be affirming that justification for logic comes from God, the existence of God does not serve as the antecedent in my modus ponens argument, but rather, logic being justified is the antecedent, and the existence of God with the aforementioned attributes is the consequent.
I do not believe that a concession should be made to the issue of the justification for logic in toto, as is generally the case in mathematics with Gödel's incompleteness theorem, but rather I believe that we ought to justify systems by whatever means are necessary. Herein, I have shown what I believe are the necessary means for justifying logic. Now, for a final clarification, I believe that many other axioms can be justified on an epistemic basis without necessarily having to go to these same great lengths. However, since all attempts to justify logic require logic, I believe we ought to escape logic, and herein I have done that by invoking God. Regarding the epistemic justification for other axioms aside from logic, I shall attempt to tackle this in another essay.
Thank you for reading.
- Eli Gardenswartz.
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